Ears and assholes

The Office of Management and Budget website, www.earmarks.omb.gov, defines earmarks as, “funds provided by the Congress for projects or programs where the congressional direction (in bill or report language) circumvents the merit-based or competitive allocation process, or specifies the location or recipient, or otherwise curtails the ability of the Executive Branch to properly manage funds.” In defense of earmarking, a legislative tactic Democrat and Republican parties employed, they were part of broader best response strategies. Yet, relying on them as a preferred method of enacting legislature damages the health of the democratic process. If used uniquely, why should legislators even bother to compromise or even write a unifying and unified bill if granting earmarks effectively buys votes? 

 

Let’s have a look at how earmarking spiraled from the start of the Bush presidency. When Republicans controlled the legislature even prior to 9/11 and the increased emphasis on defense spending it brought, cheerleading, touting, and unquestioning rubber stamping of executive spending initiatives was commonplace as evident in No Child Left Behind, faith-based agencies, and missile defenses. President Bush returned the favor for towing the administration line by signing big sending bills full of pork into law. Though bent on a DeLay-an vision of perpetual and untrammeled control, the Republicans lacked a super majority to quash a filibuster on contentious issues or confirmations. Moreover, the Republicans lost the moral high ground on matters of fiscal probity and austerity in this watered down corrupt bargain; Republican legislators had to tacitly accept the same play used by their counterparts. 

 

After the 2006 mid-term elections, Democrats, slighted and skeptical of the ability of the Executive to budget responsibly, continued to use this tactic. The result has been short of scandal only because earmarking is technically legal under legislative procedure. That it is a remedy of seeming first resort, a proactive rather than an all else fails alternative, is very alarming. Rampant and profligate abuse of a legal, yet dubious method of obtaining funding has precipitated in a race to the bottom. In another defense of earmarking, it has made the legislative process more transparent and efficient, albeit perversely. Using earmarks as a first option has exposed the motives of Congressmen with respect to which lobbyists have their ears. The voter can see where the money goes and why much more quickly than if the proposed spending were subjected to the rigor of traditional testing – caucusing and compromise. 

 

However, that is little consolation and benefit when compared to the elimination of any incentive for legislators to do any work - small wonder at the ‘do-nothing’ appellation. What made earmarking such an attractive first option rather than traditional deal-making and simultaneously eliminated the impetus for clash? The most plausible cyclical explanation has to with the re-branding of the Executive branch of government and the true legacy of the Bush presidency.

 

Gambling on Democratic quiescence (likely), the administration ran roughshod over an opposition still smarting from the 2000 election. Bush could have dismissed any partisan opposition to his agenda as non-cooperative, spiteful, and sore for at least a little while. 9/11 extended this grace period. However, the administration reaped the whirlwind of polarization strategies. Having to cope with an assertive and incompetent administration hamstrung the Democrats, keen on avoiding a fight for fear of having motives questioned and the corollary fight that such impugning would bring. By using earmarks for their ‘neglected’ projects, they seemed content to wave a pistol every time someone dared them to put up their dukes. The real shame of the earmarking scandal is not in losing a fight but rather the opposition employed a lazy coward’s way of thinking: the pistol was the only way to win it. However, when a Democrat will occupy the Oval Office eventually, he can use the same advantages the present administration has conferred onto the presidency. Perhaps the prospect that one of them could be that figure adequately deters legislators from curtailing some privileges and powers the executive co-opted. 

 

In the end, what makes earmarking so indefensible is the damage they inflict on the long term health of a democracy. To think politicians of an earlier time were above reproach is foolishly incorrect nostalgia, but continued dependence on earmarks as the favored way of political horse-trading brings the Republic ever closer to outright sale of votes. Further reasoning of structural flaws shows the following: without less vague language regarding use of earmarks, the indolent culture of the status quo will persist at least until legislators fulfill their constitutional duty of raising their own pay.