Godammit, George!

George Mitchell ought to be ashamed. Having had accepted the mantle of auditor of drug abuse in baseball, the venerable elder statesman brought the gravitas and credibility of a conciliatory agent. Accomplishments on his resume include chairmanships of Walt Disney and DLA Piper, a global law firm. Politically, as a popular senator from Maine, he served as chairman of peace talks in Northern Ireland which led to the Good Friday Accords of 1998. He also authored a 2001 report about possible conditions necessary for cessation of Palestinian-Israeli violent conflict. Publicly perceived as a voice of reason, his assistance to Al Gore during the Florida recount of 2000 gave Gore’s claims an intellectual underpinning. Arguably, he could be one of the most qualified people to be elected president of the United States, though he seems to be smart enough that campaigning for the highest office in the land will certainly ruin his life. 

 

So how does a figure of discretion and prudence, someone a part of the system but above the petty fray, get involved with the steroid scandal in baseball? Moreover, as a principal of the Boston Red Sox, an MLB club, does his authorship of the report pose a conflict of interest? Perhaps Sen. Mitchell’s record of having worked within a system without advancing a personal agenda dispels any impartiality concern. For this, he does not deserve to be maligned. Yet, his cooperation with MLB owners has been a sop to their tendencies towards entitlement of having their cosseted market power protected further. Co-opting the image of Sen. Mitchell, on the part of MLB, is indeed shameless. Sen. Mitchell should have been smart enough to know the significance of agreeing to this project. Given that the MLB owners, though well within their legal authority to elect whomever to the office of commissioner, already have one of their own installed in that office, conflict of interest is no matter to them clearly.

 

George Selig formerly owned the Milwaukee Brewers franchise. That he relinquished control of the team to his daughter upon election to the office is easily construed as a publicity stunt. Because of the antitrust protection, fans – the consumers of the MLB product - had no way of opposing the legal though dubious selection of Selig. Furthermore, unless deemed necessary by his fellow owners, the commissioner cannot be ousted for a lack of accountability. Barring some gross criminal act, seemingly no one bar the owners can hold the commissioner to account. By once again choosing from within to solve its own problems, it highlights the effect of the favorable Supreme Court ruling, (Federal Baseball Club of Baltimore, Inc. v. National Baseball Clubs 1922) it received: by having such fiat regulatory protection, not only can MLB act outside the parameters by which even regulated mutual organizations must abide, but it also seems to have no interest in any solution except self-regulation. 

 

Having such anomalous legal status owes less to a commitment to market oriented solutions than it does to being able to use such an argument only after the regulatory environment had been settled in its favor. A judiciary sympathetic to business saw greater good in reducing the volatility of early baseball leagues. However, the Court does not always get decision right the first time, and sometimes legal precedent ought to be overturned as the competitive sports league market matured. The decision allowed the entrenchment of a flawed organizational structure. While avoiding crises brought on by exogenous forces, the organizational structure has repeated self-inflicted wounds. The steroid scandal is a cyclical problem much like the 1919 Black Sox gambling affair. 

 

However, the structural failings such as the antitrust exemption and the conflict of interest within the top job are responsible for the cyclical downturn. As monopolists seeking to maintain incumbency and price as high as they can according to demand levels, each collective move by MLB ownership can be framed within the context of monopolistic behavior. Despite being a monopoly its own sport, MLB faces falling share within the broader sports market nationally due to alternatives and shifting preferences. MLB seemed content to look the other way as players bulked up. The power style of play – a topic to be addressed in this space soon - is applicable to all modern sport, and in baseball it has filled seats reliably since Babe Ruth. After the 1994 season, MLB faced sharp drops in attention and revenues. Though Whitey Ball may win games, the big stick brings attention. Attention brings revenue streams. In the words of Kurt Vonnegut, “and so it goes.” 

 

It is foolish to think that consumption of baseball will go to zero due to this or some other affair. Merely, MLB will act accordingly within the confines of its demand and cost curves. Created as an unintended consequence of profit seeking, the steroid scandal has also provided MLB another dodge to addressing its own structural deficiencies. Using Mitchell as a convenient figure of probity to investigate purported endemic cheating accomplished two things. 

 

First, it deflected attention from constantly diminishing outrage over an insider in the commissioner’s office. If anything, time has resulted in gradual, grudging acceptance of the practice. Second, the report functioned as a high priced, though necessary peace of spin which cast owners as concerned stewards. Regarding the necessity of the Mitchell Report, according to Selig, "There was a higher cost in not doing this." Certainly, alienating already tenuous consumers and discouraging new interest among fans presents huge costs to owners. Owners could not have imagined the public outcry supporting Clemens et al. For owners, the undeniable value of the Mitchell Report as a PR gimmick justifies its weighty price tag. 

 

MLB owners have been able to perform damage control, deflect criticism simultaneously, and continued defending a crumbling, flawed institutional structure prone to creating its own messes. While no profit motive confronts MLB owners to allow independent oversight, or changes in market demands require a shift in organizational structure, MLB will continue to operate as a monopoly. Rather than defining the steroid scandal as a thing itself, it ought to have been sufficient cause to re-examine the special status of MLB. That the Mitchell Report did not was a wasted opportunity. 

 

Sen Mitchell, you’re better than that.