As Jewish settlement construction has proliferated during the tenure of Israeli Prime Minister Benyamin Netanyahu, he and his coalition government have come under criticism from Israel's staunchest allies: The United States of America. Since the Six Days War of 1967, The United States has provided material and monetary aid to Israel. Additionally, United States policy has backed Israeli policy in seeming lock step during this period. Few American politicians have criticized publicly Israel's expansionist ambitions, law enforcement technique, and military incursions into Lebabon. Condemnation for the aforemtnioned has been the province of European nations such as France and Britain as well as the United Nations Council on Human Rights. However, the State Department and Vice-President Joseph Biden have had harsh words regarding settlement construction in contentious bits of the West Bank and East Jerusalem. The two principle questions are: why now? And should America scale back its relations with Israel?
First, why is now an opportune moment to criticize Netanyahu for not placing a moratorium on existing and new construction? The best answer is that the United States is holding the prime minister accountable as he is reneging on an earlier pledge. However, complex intercalated US-Israeli diplomacy provides fertile ground for what strategic signals this sends. The main signal that the United States has projected are that it cannot seemingly revert on the fine words of Cairo. For Palestinians and Arabs in the region, Obama oratory and Biden's barbs still amount to mere words. Little visible evidence exists that the current administration is any different than the previous one regarding its relations with Israel. Iraq is stabilizing within a fledgling, plural democracy. Syria has been more amenable to talks. Yet, this is not enough. Public perception holds that American foreign policy is influenced by the powerful and well-funded 'Israel lobby' of the American-Israeli Political Action Committee (AIPAC). These inherently conspiratorial claims are somewhat specious since American presidents such as Carter, Clinton and Bush the elder have been able to persuade previous prime ministers that abandoning certain expansion programs were in Israel's national security interest. What makes the claim less specious especially for those in the region is the scale of American aid to Israel in proportional comparison to that given to the Palestinians. This is the principle mitigating factor which casts doubt on American status as an honest broker for peace in the region.
However, American diplomats for too long have confused an end to settlement construction as a sufficient condition for peace. The situation is too fraught with other independent variables such as refugee right of return, the status of Jerusalem - a non-starter for even the most dovish of Israeli policymakers, and the fractious, incoherent Palestinian leadership. There is no proof that if the hammers stopped, a solution on borders would ensue. Furthermore, American diplomats have confused that material, financial and moral support for Israel would give the US greater sway over its ally. Years and billions show that Israeli ambition will not be cowed by the whims of US presidents seeking to burnish their places in history.
It is apparent why the US has reacted how it has when it has. Though this administration has shown more openness to nuance than the previous one, it does not mean it entirely understands it. Neither does the American public. Hence, the calls for the United States to 'scale back' relations with Israel. Doing this would be an exercise of folly. If the United States were to follow through on a program of ending or slowing the scale of assistance to Israel, then the strategic signal it would send to other US long-time allies such as France, Britain, and Japan is that you better do what we say. This brand of diplomacy has graver implications than the with us or against us proviso of the Bush doctrine. Even during the Bush years, when international treaties were given short shrift, and suits between the US and the EU piled up in the WTO, the Trans-Atlantic alliances held because there was always more to gain from sustained co-operation than through antagonism. However, much is won and lost in the battle of perception. Whereas other allies are big economies, Israel is at best a newcomer on the world stage. Its economy sprightly and innovative, its military and intelligence superb, Israel is still seen as a quasi-client state of the US. Because of this distinction, the United States ought to begin to treat Israel on a more equal footing. This does not entail withholding material assistance which is what the 'scale back' camp attempts to say implicitly. Moreover, what signal does it send to Israeli leadership? Essentially, it signals that the US has had enough. However, the US is the only country with any influence over Israeli policy. Will Britain and France check Israeli ambition if the US were to decide its relationship has become too cozy, and it must retrench? Loosening ties would make life more wretched for the oppressed Palestinians and could trigger a wider regional arms race and conflict if US involvement receded.
In economics, the counterintuitive solution can be the most appropriate. Similarly, strengthening relations with Israel at this juncture is the correct course of action. However, aid to Palestinians must increase. Moreover, it must not be tied to anodyne conditions. Basic improvements in infrastructure and funding NGOs and private firms to provide basic services to improve the lives of the impoverished are key. If schools and hospitals go up in Gaza, built with US funds, designed by an Israeli architect, then that would show that the US indeed is interested Palestinian concerns. If more profound diplomacy creates special economic zones on the border, then a future, more permanent solution would not destroy drivers of wealth creation and opportunity for both sides. The rules and the order have changed since 1967. So have the terms of trade. 'Scaling back' relations with Israel might be a seductive option. Yet, though the rest of the world might not perceive the US to be an honest broker in the region, it is the only one with enough clout to elicit concessions from Israel. That might suffice to make it an honest fixer.